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The Social and Marketing Networks among Traders:





Relationships among social actors are not primarily a product of aggregated
exchanges, rather they are structured by social activities as a whole and tied in a complex
of social networks (Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988: 222). In the context of the market
economy, one important role of networks is not only to shape an operation of markets, but
also to intertwine market actors with the local community where the markets operate
(Swedberg, 1994, 269-270). In other words, the operation of markets depends on larger
social networks beyond the markets themselves. Thus, functional relations between the
markets and larger communities reflect the embeddedness of the economic system in the
social system (Polanyi, 1957; Granovetter, 1992). In this regard, the pattern of social
relationships among market actors themselves corresponds to patterns of social actions of
the community in general.
Concerning the social system, networks play a role of social governance in
establishing or maintaining social relationships between individuals in terms of market
purposes or other aims. For this reason, networks serve as a form of ”social glue” that
binds individuals together in coherent behaviors (Powel and Smith-Doerr, 1994: 369). In
the Minangkabau context, networks are usually included in the study of kin relationships
(see Naim 1973; Kato, 1980, 1982; Kahn, 1976; Reenen, 1996; Manan, 1995). The kin
relationships reflect, in one sense, intertwined lines of social relationships among members
of families, lineage or clan. In another word, the kin relationships are the basis of
”Minangkabau networks”.
That network, resulting from the kin relationships, is based on the spirit of
"familism" (kekeluargaan) and "ethnicism" (kesukuan) cannot be in doubt. These spirits
are translated into various observable matters, such as, relationships between migrants
(urang rantau) and villagers of origin (urang kampuang)1, neighborhood relationships, the
                                                       
1 These relationships are usually manifested by remittances (kiriman pitih) sent by migrants to their family
members in their own village (Reenen, 1990; 1996), or, by establishment of nagari associations (ikatan-
ikatan keluarga) in frontier areas (rantau) that bridge home people and migrants (LKAAM Lintau Buo,
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communal organization of economic resources (ikatan-ikatan keluarga) and so on. Beyond
the explanation of these concrete aspects of Minangkabau networks, however, the
economic motives that underlie the network cannot be denied. What is at further issue is
that many writers on the Minangkabau have not paid sustained attention to how the so-
called ”Minangkabau network” has shaped the structure of market life. One consequence is
that we are not able to understand the nature of the kin network’s role, direct and indirect
which is important in forming market actors’ dispositions to trade, for example.
A market may represent, referring to the notion of the market as a social structure, a
concrete form of social relationships through the reproduction of signaling and
communication among market actors (Swedberg, 1994: 268). In conjunction with this
argument, it is assumed that the market system and the actors involved, along with
prevailing social norms and values, contribute to the formation of the network in the
market context. The purpose of this paper, then, is to try to enrich our understanding of
networks that are mostly established by market actors under circumstances of transactions
and other trading activities.
B. Meanings of Social Relationships for the Establishment of Network
B.1. Types
Social relationships cannot be separated from their meanings that more or less
underline networks in the trade context among the Minangkabau community. These
meanings are, however, closed to various objectives set by market actors when establishing
and perpetuating networks. These meanings are as follows:
1. Hubungan sakampuang (a fellow villager meaning for relationships). This meaning
suggests that when market actors seek initial partners at the marketplaces located
outside of their village of origin, they will usually choose fellow villagers as the
potential closest partners. For this reason, traders usually share the same feeling of
fate as ”a foreigner” (urang asing) with fellow villagers at places they meet. This
shared fate, then, encourages, on a certain level, a certain intensity of relationships.
To establish their relationships on a meaningful basis, traders, in many cases also
migrants, express their social ties in the form of trader associations (ikatan
pedagang) in frontier areas (rantau) (Limbago, 1996).
 Hubungan biasa (a habitual meaning for relationships). This meaning emerges
under conditions where traders are tied by common relationships of exchanges.
                                                                                                                                                                            
1996). In many cases, most Minangkabau will seek out their relatives or their countrymen when migrating
for the sake of protection, obtaining a job, financial help and so on.
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Based on this meaning, a network is usually maintained as long as the goals and the
profits, potentially resulting from such relationships, are successfully reached. The
small case of a cloth trader at the Tabek Patah market illustrates this: A cloth trader,
who comes from Kumango Village in Tanah Datar, usually obtains his goods from
a few wholesalers (grosir) known to him at the city market of Bukittinggi or
Padang. With these related grosir he establishes a lasting and mutual trading
network based on buying and selling of cloth and textiles. Therefore, it is not
necessary for him to buy goods from any other grosir. This trader considers his
exchange relationships and ties with these usual wholesalers are real and temporary
in nature. In addition, he only has contact with these grosir when he buys goods
from them.
2. Hubungan induk samang - anak galeh (a stratified definition of relationship). This
definition can be interpreted as referring to a specific basis of marketing
relationships that involves traders and goods producers in so-called patron and
client ties. These ties are established on a functional basis and used to transform the
market for goods or services into a desired profit for the actors involved. Traders
function directly as the retailers of producer’s goods and they sell these goods at
various marketplaces in accordance with a prevailing market circulation. The
producers, on the one hand, function to guarantee the provisions of goods
(sometimes also money), supplied on every market day, for these traders. Through
such a partnership, the producers can sustain their production process, and on the
other hand, the traders can perpetuate their job. For example, at the Tabek Patah
market, a few sellers retail chickens supplied by a poultry breeder. The breeder then
regularly supplies each seller with up to 50 chickens on every market day. He sets a
basic price for each chicken, but the actual selling price at the market is set by the
sellers themselves. In this situation, the breeder assumes the position of induak
samang (the patron), and the sellers play a role as anak galeh (the client). Both the
chicken supplier and the sellers are involved in a reciprocal relationship (hubungan
saling membutuhkan) based on the marketing of goods.
In agricultural activities, a similar relationship, defined in the same way, also
often occurs. Peasants are able to maintain their activities throughout every planting
season, although they lack the money (capital) for the provision of some major
things needed for a successful crop. In this case, peasants try to find someone who
can provide some capital. A capital provider can be anyone with money, but not
every peasant can be a capital borrower. The factors of trust and honesty come into
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play. Both trust and honesty are derived and controlled by sentiments based on
religion, kinship and by ethnic factors.
For example, a local tailor (penjahit) and his wife’s younger brother are
involved in an agricultural business based on the reciprocal feeling (perasaan
saling membutuhkan) of their affinal relationship and on economic goals. In this
business, the local tailor takes the position as the capital provider (induak samang)
and his wife’s brother as the receiver of capital (anak ladang). Their business
network is depicted in the following story:
Af (42) is a local tailor (penjahit) at the Village of Tabek Patah. He
occupies a small kiosk (9 m²) as his place of work. The kiosk is just located 10
meters from the big roof (los) of the Tabek Patah marketplace. This means that
his kiosk is located at the center of the marketplace. To do his job, he uses two
sewing machines and one hemming machine. For the profit sewing shirts and
trousers, he is able to save a bit of money. The savings, according to him, will be
invested in some agricultural business. The purpose of this is to increase the
income and achieve a better level of life for his nuclear family.
To raise a crop by himself, he has no skill or time, and especially, he lacks
a piece of land for cultivating cash crops (as a married man, he lives in his wife’s
village in accordance with the matrilocal residence pattern). Therefore, he needs
a business partner who can cultivate a field using his money (capital). He thinks
that it is better to give a loan to a familiar person than to a stranger. Through
choosing a familiar person, firstly, he can have control over the use of the capital
he lends. Secondly, he can easily discuss a potential profit or a profit margin with
someone who he is used to working with.
Supported by his wife, he decided to choose her brother (Bujang, 31) and
provide capital to him. In this business arrangement, Bujang is Af’s capital
receiver (anak ladang) and the land used for the cultivation is owned by Bujang.
They decided to grow tomatoes. The cultivation was begun with the planting of
6,000 tomato seedlings. If the tomato seedlings would produce successfully, each
seedling would yield six kilograms of fresh tomatoes. That meant that 6,000
seedlings could produce altogether 36 tons of tomatoes.
During the growing season, Af did not give Bujang the cash all at one.
Rather he gave him the capital in terms of the requirements of the cultivation
process at each stage. Bujang indicated what was needed, then Af would give the
money. After the first half of the cultivation period, Af had spent about
Rp.400,000,- used for buying fertilizer, insecticide, and some other equipment.
Af estimated that the capital provided up to harvesting would be about
Rp.500,000,-. In reality, the sum could have been more than his estimation. It
depends on problems that may arise during cultivation, such as a sickness called
”the death of young tomato plants” (mati bayuang), or heavy rains or other plant
diseases etc. If the harvest would go well, and the market price of tomatoes
would be good (the reasonable market price of each kilogram of tomatoes is
Rp.900), Af estimated that he would make a good profit. Based on the discussion
between them the profit, after the operational costs were subtracted, would be
divided into two shares: 50 % would be for himself, and 50% for Bujang.
As long as the crop was growing, Af and Bujang were constantly engaged
in the exchange of information. Af always asked Bujang how the tomatoes were
doing. He also asked about the problems connected with the work in the field.
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On the other hand, Bujang spent considerable time, when he had no more work
to do in the field, at Af’s tailor kiosk just to inform him of the situation in the
field or just chatting. As far as Af was concerned, his business network with his
brother’s wife mainly reflected his closeness to his wife’s lineage. He was very
convinced about providing the capital to his brother’s wife, because he had
absolute trust in Bujang. This feeling could guarantee a successful business
partnership. The trust based collaboration would strengthen his affinal
relationship with his wife’s lineage at the same time. (At the time of the research,
their tomato cultivation was not finished. There was still about two and half
months to go to harvest, but were the prospects for a successful crop good)
4. Hubungan dunsanak2 (kin meaning of relationships). This meaning usually
defines the majority of social relationships among the Minangkabau. In the market
context, this meaning comes into play to strengthen personal ties and positive
emotions among market actors involved in a trading network. By using this shared
meaning, traders can control unfair trade competition between fellow traders.
Example 1:
A cosmetics trader at the Tabek Patah market trades together with a son of his
mother from her second husband (dunsanak lain ayah). They collaborate on
selling articles. Therefore, it is not necessary for them to compete with each other
when retailing similar types of goods.
Example 2:
Another case is a trader of salted fish (ikan asin) who trades together with his
daughter and his daughter’s husband (sumando). They occupy trade spaces close
to each other at the same marketplaces. His daughter and his daughter’s husband
sell a similar type of goods as he does. As far as their trade activities are
concerned, he tries to avoid as much as possible any impression of collaborative
price setting with them to customers. He tries to make it clear that their kin
relationships have nothing to do with the oscillating prices of their goods.
Example 3:
Another case is a shoe and sandal trader who sells these goods together with his
younger brother. His brother sells related and complementary goods, such as
shoestrings, socks, shoe polish, etc.. If a buyer wants to buy shoestrings, he just
recommends the buyer to go to his brother who trades beside him.
The trading networks created by most traders refers to these relationship meanings
as the basis of their formation. These meanings become crucial, when they come into play
                                                       
2 The term dunsanak is a general term of reference without specifying a kinship tie. This term is used either
in the context of affinal or in consanguinal kin relationships. Someone who has been linked by means of
these kin relationships will be said to be dunsanak (a relative). In fact, this term is also applied as a term of
address in daily situations without emphasizing whether someone is related by affinal or consanguinal ties.
A close friend can be addressed with dunsanak (sometimes just sanak). In order to avoid formal relations,
this terms is also used to address persons involved in the relationships. To some extent, this term is also
expressed as a kind of the politeness, when someone wants to address an unfamiliar person or someone
newly met.
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of a mechanism of control within any ongoing network. Specific goals of an established
network, such as reduction of competition, or a better supply of goods, etc. can be
achieved when traders can take these meanings into consideration. Hence, functional
aspects of the meaning of relationships and the business network are common.
B.2. Moral, Reciprocal and Islamic Notions Behind Established Networks
The sustained factors that also shape networks are the moral rule of ”sagan
manyagani” (literally meaning an ”awkward feeling”) and the mechanism of mambaleh (
reciprocity). Relations of both can be delineated as follows: When a Minangkabau has
received a valued gift or present, or help from relatives or friends or anyone else, then they
should have the feeling that they must repay it in the future. This feeling, in turn, makes the
person uncomfortable if he/she has not yet reciprocated the favor. These factors, at least,
are an inherent part of the Minangkabau culture. As an adat proverb states: adaik diisi,
limbago dituang (the custom should be followed, and the institution should be referred to).
This means that every Minangkabau’s behavior must be according to tradition as stated
philosophically in customary law. This custom is also believed by the Minangkabau to be a
reflection of Islamic norms; ”berbuat baik kepada sesama manusia” (to be kind and
respectful to other human beings). This principle persuades Muslims to repay every
kindness received from other human beings.3
In this regard, it is misleading to perceive that both indigenous custom and Islamic
norms are paradoxically practiced by the Minangkabau (Abdullah, 1978, Hamka, 1984,
Metje, 1995). The Minangkabau always use their customary law (adat) and Islamic norms
in complementary ways. These ways are expressed in few adat proverbs. First, ”syaraik
mangato adaik mamakai (the religion says, the custom does). Secondly, ”adaik basandi
syaraik, syaraik basandi Kitabullah (the custom is based on the religion, the religion is
based on the Koran). And thirdly, ”syaraik mandaki, adaik manurun” (religion goes up to
the hill, custom goes down).
Some applications of Minangkabau adat are, however, regarded not suitable to the
prevailing Islamic norms that should be the primary reference of proper behavior. For
example, based on Islamic norms, a person should try to gain from every endeavor ”a
sincerely religious feeling” (takwa). In most case, adat tends to lure the Minangkabau into
materialistic and prestige oriented behaviors. This is because the materialistic view is
                                                       
3 The Minangkabau are well known as devout Muslims. There is one city in West Sumatra, namely Padang
Panjang, that is called as a ”serambi Mekah” (”the front porch of Mecca”) because of its distinguished
Islamic characteristics, especially the mushrooming of modern Islamic schools since the Dutch colonial era.
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lurking within adat itself (Navis, 1969:13). In this sense, Navis argues that the
Minangkabau mostly treat Islamic norms as a part of their customary law. Hence, he
emphasizes that customs should not be transformed into Islam, rather, Islamic norms
should be transformed into customs (Navis, 1969:12). The former indicates that it should
not be surprising if the Minangkabau practice Islam differently from that stated in Koran
and hadis (collection of stories relating words and deeds of the prophet Muhammad). In
any case, the Minangkabau should always be conscious of the latter when trying to practice
Islam as correctly as possible.4 The corollary is that any customs that conflict with Islamic
norms should be abandoned.5
B.3. Terms of Address in a Network
At present, the Minangkabau recognize the formation of new kinds of social
stratification based on the categories of economy and education (see also Kato, 1982:186-
193). These modern categories of social stratification probably reinforce hierarchical social
structure among the Minangkabau in addition to social positions based on  customary  law.
In
fact, these categories often become observable through the use of terms of address for
them, signifying social position, such as ”si guru” (the teacher), ”ustadz” (the religious
teacher), ”si supir” (the driver), ”si tukang sapu” (the sweeper) and so on. Each term of
address refers clearly to a certain social position and occupation, in this sense economic
level.
In fact, the terms used sometimes have an impact on the person addressed who is
involved in a social network. Therefore, in maintaining a good relationship in a certain
network, the Minangkabau call someone’s position in caution. This happens usually in a
situation where a person’s position is lower than another or the occupational term
mentioned supposedly relegates someone to a lower position, such as the car owner to his
driver, the market administrator to the sweeper, or the capital owner to his capital receiver
(anak ladang) etc. In consequence, a creation of a special term of address for someone
who carries out jobs that are asserted as low, should be made. The term of address then
used is usually the kinship terminology. This kin term of address is used as a neutral, even
friendly, way of expression. This kin term, however, is usually used in the presence of the
related person and others. But, if the person is not present at that moment, his lower social
position will be openly referred to.
                                                       
4 However, the strong application of customary laws rather than Islamic norms in daily practice is still
obvious. This can still be seen in the law of inheritance, and the preference for relationships that is always
based on the interest of members from the side of matriline, rather than from the patriline (Syarifuddin,
1984). In addition, however, kin closeness to the patriline instead of to the matriline represents a stronger
religious feeling than of attachment to customary law (Reenen, 1996: 4-5; Rasyad, 1998).
5 This is similar to what was declared by the Padri movement (1803-1837) that wanted to accomplish an
Islamic revolution and change all adat based behaviors to Islamic practices (Dobbin, 1977, Hamka, 1984).
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For example: Case 1
 A Capital Owner (induk semang)
third person
Capital receiver (anak ladang)
In this situation, the capital owner will often address his capital receiver as ”a
relative (dunsanak)”, or ”younger brother (adiak)”, or ”a man’s sister’s children”
(kamanakan) etc. The kinship terminology is a necessary substitute for the actual status of
the capital receiver, when he is  present along with the third person.
For example: Case 2
 Capital Owner (induk semang)
third person
(This person is not present, but becomes the topic of conversation)
Capital receiver (anak kerja)
In this situation, the capital owner chats about his capital receiver with a third
person. The capital receiver will frankly mention the status and position of the capital
receiver without disguising them with any kin terms.
C. Transactions and Network Spaces
C.1. Transaction in the Field and face-to-face Relationships
Most peasants, or villagers in general, are quite familiar personally with middlemen
who regularly come to them to buy produce. A few of them are even members of their own
village community. The transaction between middlemen and peasants take place at home
or in the field. Both middlemen and peasants usually engage in the transaction through
personal familiarity. Therefore, the personal factors, in this sense, usually come into play in
the process of setting prices (Burns, 1977: 11). In addition, the direct transaction in the
field identifies the simplest type of exchange as ”cash and carry” and illustrates the face-to-
face relationship that exists between the parties.
Syawal works as a peasant and lives in the Koto Alam village. This village is
located five kilometers from the district center (Tabek Patah) and 22 kilometers from the
city of Batusangkar. Geographically, it is located on the western slope of the Merapi
mountain, a famous volcano, which is important in Minangkabau social history.
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The village where he lives can be described as an underdeveloped area. The lack of
infrastructure is quite obvious; no electricity, no road networks connecting areas inside
and outside the village, no telephones. This area, though underdeveloped, has fertile soil
for planting various cash crops such as tomatoes, cinnamon, rice, chili and various
vegetables and fruits.
Considering this valuable richness of the local soil, Syawal grows tomatoes as his
major cash crop and from this source he earns his family income. He usually plants at
least 1000 tomato seedlings in his field each planting season. According to him, this
number of seedlings will produce about four tons of tomatoes. He himself admits that the
net profit obtained in every growing season is at least one million Rupiah after the
subtraction of operational costs spent during the cultivation process. This profit
represents the result of a three-month’s work period.
To market the crop, he does not have to go to the nearby market. Rather, he just
waits for the visit of a local middleman ( kalene kampuang) who regularly comes to him.
The nearby market is the Tabek patah market. The middleman usually picks up his
tomatoes and pays for them in cash. As a result of a long standing trade relation with this
middleman, Syawal feels that a particular social relationship with this middleman has
been established. Syawal feels an intimate with the middleman as with a relative. Syawal
is familiar with the middleman’s background, he knows his address, his family, his work,
his joys and sorrows in his job, and so on. In brief, they know each other well. Resulting
from this close relationship, despite the notorious reputation of most middlemen, Syawal
holds the middleman in high esteem. He argued that a devout Muslim should not be
distrustful and have negative expectations ( suuzon) of anyone else, even of a middleman.
In fact, his tomatoes are regularly bought by this middleman shortly after
harvesting. Therefore, he is quite confident of earning income on a regular basis. Based
on this situation, he improves his family income by only cultivating tomatoes, rather than
growing other cash crops, each planting season. He also uses his harvest profit to pay for
things he buys, such as a television and a storage battery, a plastic mat, a bed, a cupboard
etc. The goods he bought were obtained from the middleman. He intentionally used the
benefit of the close relation that he has with this middleman. When Syawal needs
something, then he just asks his middleman for it and the middleman will try to set it for
Syawal. In doing so, Syawal conducts the transaction as a ”barter” exchange. Syawal
regards the middleman not only as his customer for his tomatoes, but also as an
intermediary person who can provision him with goods he needs. Thus, according to
Syawal the middleman is not only his business partner, but, more importantly, also his
close friend.
What does the case described above mean? This case, at least, indicates the form of
limited transactions that includes the market actors’ objectives. The tie between these
market actors centers on a personal relationship between the actors and is underlined by
some indigenous definitions of social relationships. Although the social tie itself is limited,
the significance of the relationships is not limited. It tends to develop from a very specific
to a broader social relationship.
The tie between peasants and middlemen, in the case above, reflects a business
network that still maintains the closeness of the social contacts, the face-to-face
relationships, and a familiarity with actors’ personal identities. In the sense of economic
transactions, the case above also depict aspects of network that are important to limit
transaction risks that may arise due to lack of formal controls over the so-called ”village”
transaction. As a result, any guarantee of the success or the failure of the transaction is hard
to predict. Thus, peasants try to insure a successful transaction by personal effort and
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through the mechanisms of control beside the economic institution in itself, such as social
and religious norms or values. As Burns argues:
”The amount of good faith and personal effort that a partner put into seeing that an
agreement is fulfilled can affect the degree to which problems and damages
disrupt trade.” (Burns, 1977:14)
Forms of social networks in urban space, that retains a rural atmosphere that is
indicated by close contact among people as a primary pattern of social contact, has been
shown by Heike Bremm in ”Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen in einem javanischen Kampung”
(the neighborhood relationships in a javanese Kampung) (1989). Bremm indicates that in
the city, especially in a ”village” city (kota kampung), the picture showing people’s lives in
a physically very crowded space is quite obvious. There, individuals are structured into
groups of households that retain the ongoing transactions and the reciprocal exchange,
cooperative works, and the face-to-face relationship (Sicht-Kontakt) characteristic of
village society (Bremm, 1989: 52). In this situation, the network arises among limited
participants and is centered on certain egos. This network is categorized as a personal
network (persönliches Netzwerk) (Schweizer, 1989:12). As Schweizer says:
”Grundsätzlich wird (1) das persönliche Netzwerk, das an einem Ego verankert
dessen/deren Interaktionspartner erfaßt, vom (2) Gesamtnetzwerk (”complete
network”) unterschieden. Das aus der Perspektive eines einzelnen Akteurs
betrachtete persönliche Netzwerk wird in der Literatur auch ”egozentriertes
Netzwerk” genannt.” (a personal network is the interaction of partnerships that
center on a certain ego…According to the perspective of individual actors, this
personal network is also called an ”ego-centered  network”).
When a network is based on a number of participants and these participants exchange
goods and services with each other, it is called an exocentric network (Bremm, 1989:52).
In Minangkabau villages, the face-to-face relationship, despite being still in effect,
tends to be shifting to a another pattern of social contact among villagers. Seen in the
lineage context, that this kind of relationship, which is manifested by the social control of
mother’s brothers (mamak) over their sisters’ children (kemenakan), and of lineage heads
(penghulu) over lineage members, is becoming weaker and looser, cannot be in doubt. The
primary cause is the ongoing culture change, and the especially challenging transformation
in terms of material goods and related behavior, experienced by the Minangkabau (Syairin,
1992: 34). In this current situation, such traditional types of relationships tends to be acted
out in such a way that an economic interest becomes the main motive behind the social
behavior. The consequence is that social intimacies, not attached to an economic network
become less necessary. This leads to the fact that the social inclusion and exclusion
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practices of villagers, based on economic achievements as the major indicator of the
process, is becoming stronger than ever.
A decline in the importance of traditional social groups, and a rise in individualism,
is quite visible. At least, it can be noted as follows. Firstly, most villagers now tend to
pursue their own business interests by putting aside the importance of social togetherness,
or they interact with each other for the sake of individual interests instead of collective
interests. This kind of behavior is in the local term called nafsi-nafsi (”individualism”).6 As
one informant (Supono) expresses it in a common proverb: Awak mancari untuang awak
sorang, inyo mancari untuang inyo surang (literally means: I seek individually my own
advantages, the other seeks his/her own advantages).7  During the research, I was quite
surprised at the lack of social activities organized by villagers, who are economically better
off than others, to help the large number  of  the  poor  struggling  to  survive  in  their
own  village.8  An  ignorance  of  social obligations to the collectivity and for helping the
poor is becoming obvious. At the same time, however, some distinguished religious
charities, like zakat, infaq or sadaqah, are not effective in solving the problem of poverty
in the village.
In terms of with such phenomena, Hamka has noted that such social problems have
been emerging since the colonial era (Hamka, 1984:99; P&K Sumatera Barat, 1994: 21).
These problems seem to be a type of social sicknesses. Hamka painted this troubled social
picture with the help of an adat proverb (Hamka, 1984):
”Dahulu rabab yang bertangkai, sekarang lagundi yang berbunga
Dahulu Adat yang orang pakai, sekarang uang yang berguna”
(in the past, a two-stringed instrumental music had its bow,
now a sticky plant is flowering,
in the past, custom was quite strict,
now money is everything)
                                                       
6 In many Minangkabau villages, it is not rare to find poor families living side by side with relatively rich
families. It is also not rare to find relatively luxurious houses established side by side with very temporary
houses in villages. That picture of Minangkabau village life represented by heterogeneous levels of
economic prosperity is quite clear now. In the Tanah Datar regency, this picture can be found especially in
Sumanik, Sungai Tarab, Tabek Patah, Padang Luar, Balai Tangah, Saruaso, Salimpaung, Barulak villages.
7 This proverb is not a Minangkabau adat proverb. This proverb was made up by my informant as I
discussed with him the tendency of declining motivations to do collaborative work (tolong menolong)
among villagers.
8 I ever found a very poor nuclear family that made a deliberate social break with its closest neighbors. The
father did because of his hopelessness in getting help from his neighbors to overcome his poverty. As far as
he was concerned, nobody wants to help his family financially, not even his better off older sister who lives
not too far from his house. He did not know how to improve his economic condition. Thus, he decided it is
better for him to develop a ”social alienation” (menyendiri) from his own community. His action is
obviously a social protest against other social classes, especially well-to-do villagers, in the village. It seems
to him that the harmonious class relationships in the village is only symbolic (See Scott, 1985).
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This proverb means that there is an ongoing replacement of collective interests,  that
are governed by adat, with all sorts of materialistic purposes. Social ties, thus, are seen as
important only as far as the economic advantages of individuals involved can be furthered.
Secondly, most villagers do not share a common outlook. The most influential factor
in village life today is the remarkable social mobility of villagers that is supported by the
availability of communication and transportation facilities. The village is becoming the site
of open social traffic with the outside world. It has become usual for the villagers to be
accustomed to the going and coming of fellow villagers, and even of unknown persons,
who carry out a tremendous variety of activities and have various goals. However, the
similar pattern of local social interactions cannot be perceived as the reflection of shared
perceptions and common interests.
Thirdly, as a result of the situation described above, spaces for social contact among
villagers are becoming broader. Most villagers are involved in social and economic
pursuits outside of their own village scene and local interests. For example, many villagers
look for occasional jobs in the city, or other regions, or even outside the province, where
they can improve their economic status.
The table below indicates at least the decrease in frequency of face-to-face
relationship in the village.9
Table 1. The Frequency of Respondents’ Encounters with














Source: Own Data, 1996
                                                       
9 This table is based on interviews with 243 Tabek Patah villagers. They were chosen with cluster area and
simple random sampling techniques.
10 In this case, members of matriline are brothers and sisters (dunsanak kanduang), mother’s sister’s and
brother’s children (dunsanak saparuik or sepupu), mother’s brother (mamak), and sister’s children
(kamanakan).
11 Members of patriline include father’s sister and brother (bako).
12 Not relevant means that most respondents do not meet the relatives that I asked about. The reasons are
that the relatives have died, or are living far away, or respondents feel that they have no need on reason for
contact.
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Table 2. The Comparative Frequency of Respondents’ Meetings












Everyday 30.9 16 14 10.7
Three times
a week
1.6 0.4 0.8 0.4
Twice a
week
0.8 1.6 0.8 0.4
Once a week 16.5 14.4 6.2 4.9
Rarely 23.4 26.3 16.5 14.8
Not Relevant 26.7 41.2 61.7 68.7
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Own Data, 1996
The table above indicates a tendency for close relationships with relatives in
matriline becomes less frequent. Based on observations in two villages (the Tabek Patah
and Koto Alam villages of Tanah Datar regency), most villagers argue that they cannot
spend much time visiting relatives because work in the field or activities to add to their
personal incomes take up most of their time leaving little time for visits. Social meetings
with relatives, even with neighbors, tend to become less important.
Related to this point, face-to-face relationships seem not to be a primary pattern of
social interactions among villagers. Compared with the past, Ken Young argues that
Minangkabau households have already divided their roles into subsistence and economic
purposes. To some extent, these roles influence the formation of social relationships
(1994):
Firstly, the broader socioeconomic patterns of the region cannot be derived
through the simple aggregation of the village micro-processes. Households were
economically reproduced through their participation in a trade-based division of
labor which extended beyond village, and, in some sectors, regional boundaries.
Their form and function depended also on their insertion into much wider
economic processes and social relations. The second point is that the households
were not only themselves constrained by their integration into more complex
economic structures; they in turn constrained the course of development of the
same wider economy. Lastly, there were significant structural differences among
households, especially those determined by the extent and nature of the resources
they controlled, and these led to divergent responses of different classes of
household to changes in the wider economic environment (163-164).
These roles, however, were not only produced by internal factors, from the extent
of social, economic and ecological variations, but also by the external factors of Dutch
colonial interference and Minangkabau involvement in significant intra-regional and
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international trade. Thus, such factors have influenced the typical Minangkabau response,
that is of maintaining, or adapting, or changing their patterns of social relationships dealing
with relatives and other members of the local community. These divergent responses were
important since they functioned as the principal link between the larger tribute, subsistence
and commercial sectors and rural areas (Young, 1994: 161).
C.2. Transactions at Marketplaces
Marketplaces also imply an independent mechanism of the distribution of various
agricultural products.13 Peasants act as producers and as sellers of their own products, and
middlemen, who then distribute and retail those products, are involved in the transactions
at their own risk. In the past, marketplaces in Minangkabau, especially in the highland
area, functioned as the location of warehouses. Peasants had to deliver their produce to
these warehouses under the forced delivery system (tanam paksa) before they could be
traded or exported (Amran, 1985, Graves, 1981). Warehouses, and thus also the
marketplaces, functioned as a medium of the international trade cycle but also as the lowest
level of economic and political control of the Dutch colonial government over the local
community.
Now, the middleman is usually an intermediary institution that connects peasant’
produce with various marketplaces through certain marketing networks. These market
actors, as a result, control the process through the operation of the local market mechanism
without the intervention of governmental controls over their activities, like in the colonial
era. Produce bought by middlemen from peasants will then be sold to various traveling
traders, sellers and vendors at other marketplaces under competitive trade conditions. In
this sense, the relationships between peasants, middlemen and other market actors are
mainly articulated by transactions. However, they are never free from the social,
psychological, physical and economic restraints and ties affecting their marketing behavior
(Burns, 1977:20).
The nature of bargaining process, which is indicated by the face-to-face price
setting negotiations, creates social relationships between the actors who influence the
process of the transaction itself.14 In a simple picture, the transactions take place in a crowd
of peasants and middlemen in a certain area of the marketplace. At a first glance, we only
see a crowd of people who are laughing and chatting with each other, and milling around.
Meanwhile, a large amount of produce is piled up on the ground nearby. We often do not
                                                       
13 In terms of this aspect, local governments at the regency level down to the village level have no special
function in the activities.
14 In the case of weekly markets in Nasik district, India, the transactions at the market are conducted and
regularly maintained based on local values and beliefs. Moreover the activity in these markets has a
religious rhythm (Karve and Acharya, 1970).
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know at which point the transaction begins, because the setting of prices is openly done by
all market actors involved in the transactions.15
If we immerse ourselves in the trading, we can recognize at least a few of the types
of performances of market actors and the strategies they use. Middlemen usually can be
identified by the calculator and the notebook they bring with them. The calculator is used
for helping them in setting prices, while the book is used mainly for recording the amount
of goods that have been traded, and so on. Another remarkable attribute is their
aggressiveness in the face-to-face price setting negotiations with approaching peasants, as
they arrive  with  their  produce.  They   will   immediately   bombard  peasants    with
questions, such as “who is the owner this produce? (barang sia ko?)”, or “what goods do
you bring? (a galeh dibao)”, or ”How much are you going to sell these goods for?”(bara
ka di jua galeh ko?). In this sense, the recognition of typical actions of market actors is
quite necessary for identifying the transaction itself.
In terms of time, from early in the morning until about 09.00 a.m. the marketplace
are already bustle with the transactions activities. As trading begins, middlemen examine
produce offered by peasants, to see whether the goods offered are in good condition or not.
Then, the buying price is set as the result of this. Before the transaction is finally over, the
goods are weighed by a ”weigh man” (tukang timbang) who was waiting close by. The
middleman pays cash for the produce that he buys. The next step is that the goods to be
delivered are packed into a number of sacks or boxes. At this point, the transaction is
generally finished.
Basically, the transactions taking place at the market place can be characterized by,
firstly, that payment is always in cash, and secondly, that the number of market actors
involved is somewhat larger than for the transactions usually done in the fields. There are
sub-middlemen (kalene ketek), a weigh man (tukang timbang), and a carry man (anak
angkat) to facilitate the transactions at the marketplace. Thirdly, peasants have greater
possibilities to bargain over prices with more than one middleman, and other buyers in
                                                       
15 This is completely different from the pattern of transactions at livestock markets (pasar ternak), that I call
a ”male marketplace” (pasar khusus laki-laki) because only male traders and buyers are present. A specific
type of transaction is called a ”closed in-hand transaction” (barosok). This transaction is carried out secretly
and silently between a trader and a buyer. A seller and a buyer agree to a livestock price just by joining
hands and then covering them with a piece of a certain textile, such as sarong, towel, or jacket. Then, each
of their fingers makes certain gestures that symbolize the bargaining process. Nobody knows what price is
agreed upon for an animal, except the buyer and the trader who just made the transaction. The general
practice is not to allow everyone to know the price just bargained with others. If a buyer wants to know the
price of an animal, he must contact the trader himself. Thus, the trading is closed. This type of transaction in
the livestock market is completely unfair, according to most Minangkabau, and benefits only traders
because buyers remain ignorant of the price prevailing at the moment. Therefore, people think that the
barosok transaction should be banned from the livestock market and changed to the normal open type of
transaction (Haluan, May 24, 1996).
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general. This is possible because the transaction itself is open to everyone. Thus, the
influence over prices from all market actors gives rise to market competition. Fourthly, the
face-to-face negotiations to set prices of various market actors make the different meanings
of social relationships more important at the marketplace. Therefore, the transactions at the
marketplaces lead to the formation of broader personal relationships and the potential
establishment of networks.
D. Some Characteristics of Networks established at the Marketplaces
studied
D.1. Articulations of Networks
Looking at the networks among traders at the Tabek Patah market, we see that 24.2%
of traders engage in shared work (kerja sama) in order to maintain their network, and the
rest of them (75.8%) do not. Kinds of shared work are purchase of goods (11.1%), help in
providing capital and goods (3%), and the distribution of goods (10.1%). These shared
tasks are based in a feeling of friendship and of the ”similar faith” of jobs (senasib
sepenanggungan), and the familiarity of individuals who come from the same home-base
or origin (sakampuang). Shared work performed by most traders is particularly aimed at
increasing the amount of trade traders do. Although the social significance of the
relationships are limited, the network they underlie tends to be used to show ”a communal
economy”.16
Companionship is another indicator of the articulation of the network. Most traders
would rather trade without a companion at marketplaces visited (66.7%). The rest (33.3%)
need a companion when trading. Of these 28.3% are family members, and 5% are close
friend(s). Generally, it can be said that a companion is not too important for most traders.
In this regard, traveling traders can be categorized as ”lone traders”. Looking at traders
(28.3%) who prefer to trade with companions, the persons chosen to be their companions
include husband or wives (15.2%), children (7.1%), older brother or sister (4%), and own
parent (2%). In terms of who they work together, this means that the persons who are
involved in the network come especially from the traders’ kin circle or, at least, are well
known persons.
Even though most traders do not need a companion, 66.7 % of traders feel ”at home” at the
marketplaces they usually visit. They have relatives there who are also working as traders.
The status of these kin relationships can be specified as parent (2%), mother’s brother
(mamak)  (1%),  own  brothers and sisters  (dunsanak kanduang) (11.1%), mother’s sister’s
                                                       
16 This term does not mainly mean a system in which the production and distribution of goods and services
are controlled collectively instead of individually (Johnson 1995: 47). This term rather means the
understanding of shared work done in relation to trade activities, and based on individual risk-taking and
planning.
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or brother’s children (saparuik) (8.1%), own children (anak kandung) (3%), a father’s
sister (etek) (5.1%), wife’s brother or sister (ipa) (2%), and member of the same lineage
(1%). On the one hand, these figures mean that the persons who potentially may be
involved in a network include the members of the matriline and patriline. On the other
hand, the trader without companions, who has kin at the marketplace visited, indicates the
phenomenon of an ”independent enterprise” (usaha mandiri) in trade but still shows the
importance of kin ties in trading.
Since most traders tend to perform their work on an individual basis, it means that a
trade competition usually occurs among non-relatives (basaiang jo urang lain). The
expression of ”developing one’s capability to benefit oneself” (barusaho mandiri) seems to
be an ideal motivation for trade. This is, in one sense, also the motive for founding an
”individual enterprise” among the Minangkabau.
In regard to the closeness of kin relations in the context of household economy, this
type of enterprise shows personal freedom for choosing one’s occupation beyond kin
group interests. Such persons are not tied to use of communal property as a main source of
income. Secondly, this kind of enterprise is chosen by lone traders and this job is their
main source of income. This income, then, is privately owned. It means that the lineage
allows its members to concentrate on market-based economy and thus to decrease the
exploitation of the communal property for the nuclear household (see Young 1994: 149).17
Meanwhile, the need for trading companions, indicated by a minority of traders,
shows that trade still represents a part of the household economic activities. The trading is
still a form of family business. It means that the household economy includes subsistence
and commercial activities that can be carried out side by side (see also Young’s hypothesis
about this household economy, 1994).
D.2. A Contractual Basis of Networks
In the context of the marketplace organization, there is a contractual relationship
that indicates network links between the market administrator and some particular
villagers. The market administrator give some people he knows well permission to provide
trade facilities, such as bamboo platforms and chairs, and the big paper umbrellas used to
                                                       
17 In the Minangkabau context, the members of a lineage are regarded as a potential family labor pool that
has the responsibility of maintaining certain communal property (harta pusaka) including land and
livestock. This maintenance of the communal property is done in various ways, such as cultivating land and
selling the harvest, or controlling its distribution etc. The main thing is that the communal property must
provide the source of the lineage income. On the other hand, the lineage acts as a ”gatekeeper” preventing
individuals and households from alienating the matriclan property. (Young, 1994: 163).
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trade places. In return, these persons,  or  so-called  local  entrepreneurs,   must  turn  over
to  the   market administrator a certain percentage of their income. This mutual business
relation is indicated by a kind of informal contract existing between these market actors.
Out of this transaction, market administrator also develops another transaction with
other certain villagers who have a full right of setting and collecting market tax especially
in bulan Ramadhan (a fasting month) given by the market administrator. The persons take
over the job that administrator usually does during the remaining months. In return, they
should give the market administrator a sum of money that is similar in value with income
normally earned in these months. In this regard, the market administrators ”sell’ the market
by means of a special contract of time and kind of job to well known persons. These kinds
of contractual transactions, then, reveal the limited network existing between the market
administrator and particular villagers.
D.3. A Temporary Network
Some cases indicate that a number of traders try to avoid establishing a permanent
network with familiar traders, who are mostly known as fellow villagers, and who also sell
the same type of goods. They do it because they want to reduce trading competition
between them. The strategy of doing it is they avoid a visit to the same markets. In doing
so, they cannot meet each other at the same location when trading. In the markets they
attend, to establish a network with other traders, who sell different type of goods, is
considered better.
A female trader from Koto Tuo village of Sungai Tarab district does not want to
sell her coffee at the local marketplace nearby her village, though few of her
friends, who usually pound coffee beans together at a traditional waterwheel,
prefer to sell coffee at that market. The coffee she sells is well known as ”kopi
Koto Tuo ” (Koto Tuo coffee) that was originally produced in the Koto Tuo
village and is one of the best quality coffees in Tanah Datar. She prefers to sell her
coffee at Balai Tangah market (24 km from his village). She sells coffee at
marketplaces that are not attended by her friends. She does it in order to avoid
competition with her own friends, namely, her own fellow villagers. She likes to
find new friends at marketplaces far away from her nearby marketplace.
This demonstrates that networks must not be always built from long-standing social
relationships. In the case above, a group of traders do not participate in a marketing
network together with traders who come from their own village despite the fact that they
sometimes are involved together in the process of producing the same product. A
contrasting picture is shown by the case of chicken traders in the previous section. Chicken
traders come from different villages and they do not know each other beforehand.
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However, they sell similar goods together, obtained from a single producer (a chicken
raiser), at the same trade space. Through the sale of these goods, they are linked in a
marketing network. This means that a business network can arise among strangers who are
linked to one another by their relationships to one producer. These cases indicate another
aspect of competition and networks dealing with trade at peasant market.
One interpretation of the above is that the Minangkabau will compete with each
other if they occupy the same position, but are not involved in a certain network. They
only compete among themselves, not with others, but they make up a certain network with
others, and not with each other. The Minangkabau will establish a network if they are
involved in different work roles, rather than in the same position. This leads to an
understanding of characteristics Minangkabau behavior, that is, that the Minangkabau tend
to practice internal conflict. To put it another way, a network, is a strategy to avoid internal
conflict. Therefore, network and conflict among the Minangkabau can be seen as either
contradictory or complimentary methods of successful trade.
E. Type of Transaction and Social Satisfaction
Most market actors make transactions by using a system classifying the quality of
agricultural commodities. Some commodities traded in this way are cinnamon (kulit
manis), fruits (such as bananas and avocado), leeks (daun bawang), chilies (red and green),
beans, and ginger.
The most distinguished pattern of transaction is represented by the sale of
cinnamon.18 The main market actors involved in this transaction are peasants, weigh men
(tukang timbang), and sub-middlemen or middlemen. A basis for price setting is derived
from the classification of cinnamon. These grades are, firstly, AA (dobol) or KA. This grade
is produced from barks of cinnamon that have been processed in such a way that the
cinnamon is dried and the outer layer of the bark (epidermis) is gone. Its’ good color is a
bright yellow brown (coklat muda). This type of cinnamon can usually be obtained after
the tree is between 15 and 20 years old to produce a very fine quality, and 8 - 10 years old
to produce a good quality. At the market, cinnamon of this grade is sold for the highest
price.
The second type is called KB. This cinnamon is similar to the AA type, but the
difference lies in the outer layer of the bark (epidermis) which has not been removed. Its
                                                       
18 Cinnamon (kulit manis) is the major export produce of Tanah Datar regency. Every Thursday, all
cinnamon produced by peasants from Tanah Datar region is auctioned at the Guguk Ketitiran, Batusangkar
under the supervision of government officers from the trade office (Dinas Pedagangan) of the Tanah Datar
regency. Middlemen, or wholesalers and peasants are involved in the competitive transactions taking place
there.
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good color is dark yellow brown (coklat kehitam-hitaman). This grade can be produced
after the tree is up to 7 years old. This type of cinnamon is usually sold at a somewhat
lower price than
the AA type.
The third grade is called KC, also called splinters of cinnamon bark (pecahan kulit
manis). This grade is produced from the processing of the cinnamon type KB. At the
market, this type is transacted at the lowest level of the selling price in comparison to the
two types mentioned before.
Despite the fact that prices of kulit manis are basically standardized, in practice,
they are always changing. The most important factor is the ”level of dryness”, or, in the
local term called, aie. The drier the cinnamon, the higher the price will be. The grades of
dryness are commonly aie 0, aie 5, aie 8, and aie 10. The aie 0 means a perfect level of the
dryness of processed cinnamon and that its price will be set at a 100 % of the prevailing
standard market
price. For example, cinnamon grade AA has a standard price of Rp.5,200 per kilogram.
When the cinnamon of grade AA with the dryness of aie 0 is traded, then the price will be
calculated as 100% of the standard market price. The set price will be Rp.5,200 per
kilogram. The formula is (100-0)% X 5,200 = Rp.5,200,-.
If the middleman responds to the cinnamon offered by the peasant, he will first of
all check the goods to know which level of dryness the cinnamon has. If he decides the
cinnamon has ”aie 5”, it means the price will be set at:
· (100 - 5 )% x 5,200 = Rp. 4,940,-.
Thus, the standard price prevailed, but with this aie judgement the peasant can only sell his
cinnamon for a price of Rp.4,940 per kilogram, instead of Rp 5,200.
When the middleman evaluates the cinamon as ”aie 10”, then the price will be
calculated as follows:
· (100 - 10)% x 5,200 = Rp. 4,680,-.
This means that the cinnamon must be sold for this price.
The level of dryness is absolutely determined by middlemen. Under their price
control, they dominate the arena of price setting and of profit potential. This right, in a
sense, is thus a middlemen’ trick in cinnamon transactions and the middlemen’ strategy to
dominate the structure of cinnamon trading. No peasant can set the grade of dryness of
his/her goods. Even if a peasant can judge the dryness grade of his cinnamon it will, in any
case, be officially determined by the middleman. But, since the method of judging dryness
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of peasants and middlemen is different, the resulting transaction is often characterized by
tension.
 On many occasions, the aie 0 is hardly used by middlemen in the price setting
processes, although peasants offer cinnamon which they suppose meets this level.
Middlemen are seen as never grading cinnamon as ”0”, but using only levels of aie 5, aie 8
or aie 10. However, one informant (a cinnamon middleman) argued in reaction:
“The middleman (kalene) has never really suppressed the cinnamon price paid to
peasants, we only judge the level of dryness as one of the necessary factors in a
cinnamon transaction. If a middleman sets the aie unfairly, then they will lose
income, because the peasant will not want to turn over his goods to a middleman
like that”.
The argument above mostly does not represent reality, as the majority of peasants
suspect. Such an argument gives more of a hint of the secret trading strategy practiced by
most middlemen and their effects to cover up their trick. In fact, a large number of
middlemen, operating at the marketplace, have to compete with each other in their dealings
with peasants in order to have goods. Peasants often feel unhappy when facing a
middleman who is thought to be unfair to peasants about the dryness level. Since the level
of dryness is the most important factor in the cinnamon transactions besides the price itself,
a transaction usually is not done in hurry. We often see the transaction, between the same
persons, being carried out over and over. The price bargained for constantly goes up and
down, as if the price will be never set.
But as long as the goods are bought and the price is set by the same middlemen, the
peasant can never be ”a winner” in the transaction. Since the price depends completely on
the middlemen’ trading game, the successful peasant in a single transaction is one who is
able to sell all their produce, whatever the price is finally set at. In this sense, cash is the
primary aim of the needs sale. The money obtained from the sale must be sufficient to buy
daily consumption needs, and leave a certain amount to be taken home. The main aspect in
a successful transaction from the peasant’s point of view is to achieve some level of social
satisfaction (pueh).
Do peasants lose a certain amount of profit when the selling price is far lower than
what he or she expects? The answer is yes, but they still feel lucky because the money they
have earned from the sale of the crop can replace the capital invested. But, if the money
obtained is far less than the capital invested, do they still feel a loss of a profit? The answer
is no, because they still feel lucky. Why? Because all their goods could be sold (tajua
habih), and they do not have to bring produce home, although they make only a small
amount of profit. Also, they still are able to buy needed things at the marketplace. If the
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goods were not completely sold, did they lose a profit? Yes, but they still feel lucky
because they still get cash.
The passage above is a general formulation of the peasant’s social satisfaction
(pueh), that is aimed at in every transaction of their produce. The understanding of this
social satisfaction seems to be an answer to why peasants maintain a network with
middlemen despite being cheated.
Diagram 1. Cinnamon Marketing Network
Cane sugar is another important local agricultural product, which also is associated
with a typical pattern of transaction. Peasants, as the major producers of cane sugar,
usually sell their goods at an auction (lelang) at which middlemen and other retailers take
part. At the auction, middlemen play a role as the main buyers. The locally produced cane
sugar is then supplied to other marketplaces or to certain cake factories. In the Tanah
Datar, the Tabek Patah market is one of the central location of cane sugar auctions. Most
buyers who want to buy such commodities must go there.
This auction is not really carried out in accordance with the rules of a pure formal
auction. Rather, it is carried out by means of an intensive higgling and haggling going on
between the market actors. Buyers, who are mostly women, try to buy cane sugar for less
than the standard price prevailing at the moment. However, the bargaining cannot go too
far from the standard price. The peasants will otherwise only sell their goods at the more
reasonable prices offered by certain other bargainers.
Cane sugars are distributed from producers to consumers in the following pattern of
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goods at different places and time. Choices of local markets for distributing the cane sugar
to markets in Salimpaung district and surrounding area are Tabek Patah market (on
Monday), Barulak market (on Tuesday), Rao-rao and Sungai Tarab markets (on
Wednesday), Tanjung Alam and Batusangkar markets (on Thursday), Salimpaung market
(on Friday), Rao-rao market (on Saturday), and Sumanik market (on Sunday).
Producers of cane sugar sell their goods at the marketplace where demand for such
goods is high and the markets visited are, as much as possible, located near to their home
base. This is because they have to carry goods that weigh of 20 - 40 kilograms per sack.
And only a limited local transportation is available connecting their village and the
marketplace. In any case, peasants need local transportation to take their goods to the
marketplace.
If producers want to go to other market places on different market days, they have
to finish the production work connected with cane sugar a day before the market day to be
visited. Moreover, they usually choose a certain market day that is suited to their
production schedule. For example, if they are able to produce cane sugar only by Sunday,
it means that they can go to the market on Monday. If they finish their work on Thursday,
they will go to the market on Friday, and so forth. Thus, the market circulation becomes a
basis of peasant work rhythms.
F. The Marketing Network in the Village
Besides trading, traders are alert to opportunities to build relationships with other
traders at the marketplaces they usually visit. This intention shows that networks are
established in a manner in which the accessibility and the acquisition of trade spaces can
be maintained for as long as possible.
The Tabek Patah market is one of important centers for the distribution of
agricultural products in the Tanah Datar regency. At this place, middlemen and
suppliers establish marketing network for various kinds of marketable produce.
They deliver and distribute these to other traders in other urban regions, such as
Pakanbaru, Duri, Jambi cities etc. The preparation of deliveries of commodities
take place at night from 09.00 p.m. – 12.00 midnight. After that, the commodities
will be transported and arrive at the destination on the following morning. At the
destination point, these commodities are directly distributed to local wholesalers,
retailers and local traders or sellers at various marketplaces.
Distributors operating in the Palembang city of South Sumatra, who want
to supply goods to the areas above, could not get access to markets there. They
have to distribute their goods to the ”Tabek Place” distributors. These traveling
distributors also occupy a place in the marketing network for agricultural
commodities coming from Padang highland, especially from Tanah Datar, to
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many marketplaces in Pakan Baru, Dumai, Duri and Bangkinang.19 Many local
middlemen, who come from marketplaces such as Situjuh (Lima Puluh Kota
regency) and Pincuran Putih (Bukittinggi), also meet at the Tabek Patah
marketplace and sell their commodities to these distributors.




Commodities Regions of Origin
Area Province


















3. Tomatoes Baso Agam, West Sumatra
4. Sweet Potatoes and
Cinnamon
Lintau Lintau, West Sumatra
5. Chicken Payakumbuh 50 Kota, West Sumatra
6. Blacksmith-made metal
goods
Baso Agam, West Sumatra
7. Coffee Powder Koto Tuo
Bukittinggi
Tanah Datar, West Sumatra
Agam, West Sumatra




Source: Own Data 1996
Based on the table above, we see that several commodities are marketed to areas
crossing the provincial borders. The pattern of marketing networks is indicated by the flow
of a number of commodities, that come from the local level and are sent to the broader
marketing level of the region. The goods, such as chilies, tomatoes, beans, springs onions,
come from Tabek Patah village and are supplied to Dumai, Batam and Duri, Tanjung Balai
Karimun, Selat Panjang (all located in Riau province), and city market in Jambi province.
Other types of produce such as chilies, tomato, avocados, bananas come from the Tabek
Patah market and then are supplied to Palembang city of South Sumatra, Jakarta, and
Padang (West Sumatra).
                                                       
19 All these cities are located in Riau province, the neighboring province of West Sumatra in the eastern part
of the province border. In the past, this was an important eastern route of Minangkabau trade (Graves,
1981).
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A marketing network is shaped by the role of local distributors who dominate the
trading network from the local marketplaces up to the markets in the cities. One marketing
network indicates the trade route that is dominated by local market actors.
Diagram 2. The Pattern of Distribution of Agricultural Products Through The
Tabek Patah Market
F.1. Between Local Trader and Big Traders: Business and Faith
Personal relations between the local trader and the big trader are regarded as one
important factor in the marketing network. These relations are characterized as informal
relationships between trading partners who are interested in marketing certain goods. The
networks so built are aimed at keeping the supply of distinctive commodities and services
between traders sustainable. Taking a look at a trader who sells various types of hats
(pedagang topi) at the Tabek Patah marketplace we can capture the essence of such
relations:
The trader explained that he is the only trader who sells hats at the Tabek
Patah marketplace. He describes himself as a ”lone fighter of a trader” (galeh
sorang) because he has no relatives who attend this market, and as a traveling
trader (pedagang babelok). He admits that he has a marketing network, that he
deliberately set up with other big traders who sell various models of hats at the
bigger market in the city. He does not like, in contrast, to join in a marketing
network with other traders at the village markets. He does what he does because
he wants to obtain certain goods. It is better for him not to have goods that are also
sold by other traders at village markets. He claims that if many traders do not sell
the same commodities as he does, it means he can reduce his competitors, and
consequently, can have a greater opportunity to make a bigger profit. Therefore,
he maintains supply channels with bigger traders who can give him specific
goods. Many big traders usually reserve particular goods for him.
City
markets
Local distributors at the
Tabek Patah marketplace
Local markets Local markets
City
markets
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-Hats and socks are supplied from the city market of Bukittinggi.
-Belts are sent from Jakarta through his friends there.
-Bags are supplied from Bukittinggi and Jakarta.
-The normal muslim-used hats (kopiah) are directly supplied from
  produces in Baso (near Bukittinggi city).
 As far as the marketing network is concerned, both the local trader and big traders
not only exchange goods, but also market information. The local traders often inform the
big traders about those goods currently favored by villagers. Based on this information, the
big traders then provide the local trader with the goods requested. This type of relationship,
I prefer to describe as a form of hierarchical network flow (hubungan bajanjang naiak,
bajanjang turun). A local trader contacts the big traders. In turn, these traders send the
needed goods to the local trader.
This kind of relationship lacks marketing network ties between local traders, but
increases the networks with the bigger traders operating outside of the local marketplaces.
This kind of network is primarily used to increase the chances of obtaining a supply of
particular goods from the big traders. To maintain the network, local traders always pay
cash for all the goods they obtain, instead of paying for them on credit. On the other hand,
the bigger traders prefer to give the local traders, who pay for goods in cash, more chances
of having certain goods, than those traders who want to have goods on credit. This means
that the marketing network still operates on the basis of informal contracts by means of the
practice of these cash and carry purchases. These relationships depict a use of market
rationality.
In any case, market rationality requires the liberty and equality of relations between
potential and real exchange partners. However, this rationality requires a depersonalization
of the act of exchange, its reduction to a transaction on the basis of a contract, and is
principally emotionally neutral in character as far as the trading partners are concerned,
although with a highly individualized interest (Buchholt and Mai, 1994:163).
F.2. Between Local Traders and Customers
Some local traders and certain customers also establish a personal network. Through this
network traders can retain certain customers by means of goods which are paid for by them
on  credit.20  The  credit  is  in  fact  a  very  suitable  way  of  trading  that  is  based on a
combination of social and economic factors, namely, on trust (picayo), good faith (nasib
                                                       
20 This credit, in local term called kredit, is not a loan as commonly practiced according to the formal
procedure of business, such as by banks. This is only an indigenous custom of selling goods by traders
where buyers are allowed to pay for the goods they buy in several installments.
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elok) and faith in God (pasrah). For customers, the personal relationship they establish
with certain traders is useful in obtaining desired goods when they do not have enough
money to pay for the goods immediately.
The process of such credit based trade is as follows: A trader sells certain goods to
his customers on the basis of an informal contract of payments. In this kind of payment, the
trader permits customers to pay in several installments and usually does not set any kind of
interest for such payment. The time schedule of the payments is agreed upon considering
the buyers’ circumstances. The trader and the buyer then make a verbal deal that consists
of the buyer’s promise to pay for goods with certain sum of money divided into several
payments. The trader records the customers’ name and an address that is usually just the
customer’s village (kampuang) but not a detailed address such as name of a street, the
house number etc.. They make no formal bill of credit or a formal statement of the
transaction. At that time, the buyer play a role of ”a debtor” of the trader, and from that
point on he is tied by the social and economic obligation to repay his/her debt.
On every market day, ”the debtor” comes to the trader to pay his debt. This action
is expressed by pai baia utang.21 Sometimes, ”the debtor” does not come to the trader to
pay his debt on the agreed upon schedule. In this case, the trader has no means of forcing
the indebted customer to come to pay.
 Sometimes, the ”debtor” comes to pay his debt, but the amount of the payment is
less than promised. In this case, the trader also usually does nothing. A break of the stated
promise by ”the debtor” is so far tolerated by the trader. The trader then can only look
forward to the next payments. The important thing is the credit should be finally paid by
the ”debtor”.22
An extreme event sometimes happens. The ”debtor” often runs away from his
obligation to pay the debt. In this situation, the trader can do nothing. The trader only
thinks about it as a lack of good faith (marugi). By contrast, he will have a good faith
(nasib elok), if the credit can be paid for by the ”debtor”, even though not on time.
In agreeing to such credit, most traders are submissive to luck and faith, even if
some of their ”debtors” disappear and never show up again to pay their debts. This
indicates a trader’s attitude of submission to the will of God (pasrah) in every bad situation
                                                       
21 To a certain extent, this term is sometimes clearly said to be the symbolic expression of good manners.
When a debtor can pay his debt on time, he will be proud of it. People often do not see the debt itself as the
issue, rather to the action of payment as a symbol of a social obligation that is accorded with adat as it is
called kato dahulu batapati (a word given must be kept) (Hakimy Dt. Rajo Penghulu, 1978: 157-158). The
action of paying the word, called manape’i janji (when you give your word you must keep it).
22 As long as the credit is still ongoing, the ”debtor” may apply for another credit to buy more goods from
the same trader.
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of their business. A cloth trader (Said, 55) who usually practices such a local credit system
said:
”by trading with credit in this village (the Tabek Patah village), it is not
necessary for me to be strict, rather I always follow local villager’s custom. As
long as I do it in such a way, a bad situation that affects on my credit hardly
ever happens to me. So far, I have been able to increase my customers. I only
notice that many local villagers here like to do business with me...If the bad
situation finally happens to me, I can only put my faith in God...”
The combination of doing trade with the use of a rational calculation and faith in God
is the most characteristic trait of Minangkabau traders. Traders commonly believe that the
final result of their trading is God’s decision. In many cases, religious belief still plays an
important role in Minangkabau trade as a whole.23
 F.3. Hidden Competition
Trade activities are not very busy except on market days. This slack period for
trading threatens some business that are located at the market place, as experienced by
many local restaurant owners (lapau nasi) at the Tabek Patah marketplace. Unlike on the
main market day, the four local restaurants (lapau nasi) are often empty of customers.
These slack days bring about a considerable decrease of profit due to lack of customers.
Therefore, their expectation of having more customers on the market day, due to the
market crowd, is very high.
On the market day, the market crowd actually does not directly bring customers into
the lapau nasi. One of the owners of a lapau nasi observes that many market visitors love
to eat at ”a hot food counter under a bamboo shelter” (kedai nasi bertenda) that are only
available on the great market day, instead of eating in the lapau nasi. These food tents
offer a various specific and favorable foods, such as nasi kapau (kapau rice). Considering
this visitor habit, she feels unhappy. She thinks that these kedai nasi bertenda are her big
competitors in business. As she said:
”Most of those kedai nasi (the food tents) mostly do not sell fresh-cooked foods.
They usually cook their foods a few days before. Sometimes they sell ”old foods”
(samba nan diangekan) from the leftovers left unsold on days before. So, I think
the cooking of those temporary small food tents is not really tasty (indak
                                                       
23 In comparison with the case of market traders in Roman North Africa, the mechanisms of social controls
over the market reflect the dominant ideological system in the society or the religion, instead of the controls
being provided by the secular political level (Shaw, 1979:95)
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badaceh). In contrast, I always sell fresh dishes everyday, therefore I can
guarantee that my cooking is very tasty...”24
Her argument sounded cynical to me. It seems to signify a hidden competition
strategy. She tries to spread a certain rumor with the hope that it will tempt many visitors to
come to her restaurant. Based on my interview with various owners of food tents, they do
not ever sell non freshly-cooked foods that are leftover from days before. According to
them, it is quite dangerous to do this.
Based on this contradictory point of view, I see a latent competition between
cooked food sellers at the Tabek Patah market. The informant quoted above feels that other
cooked food vendors are real competitors who pull her potential customers into their tents.
She expects a good chance of having many customers on the main market day. In reality,
her expectation does not come true.
In fact, cooked food vendors have no specific strategy of attracting as many as
possible customers, such as making a promotion or advertisement etc. In general, they do
not do anything to attract many customers to come to them. One persuasive strategy for
their customers is telling something negative or spreading slightly rumors about other
traders. This is regarded as a form of hidden competition among them. This illustrates
another of traders’ characteristic ways of doing business. In this regard, a personal network
for mutual help does not come into play.
G. Conclusion
In general, the market circulation functions to serve traders as locations for the
establishment of networks. As a matter of fact, the market circulation articulates two kinds
of networks, these are, marketing networks (hubungan dagang) and networks (hubungan
pribadi). The former is the network that takes place as a result of trade activities. That the
market operates on different days and areas helps traders to build the network for the sake
of goods provisions, reduction of trading competition and to maintain profits. Meanwhile,
the latter is the kind of social network that is established by virtue of social closeness or in
the spirit of Minangkabau relationships. In this sense, the social relationships is put into the
frame work of ethnic consciousness of the Minangkabau : ”samo maraso sebagai urang
minang” (the shared feeling of the Minangkabauness).
                                                       
24 She made this statement to me as I interviewed her. At that interview, I was having lunch at her restaurant.
This shows how is her feeling about the trade competition between local food vendors.
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As expressed in many cases, most market actors regard politeness and friendliness
as the most important elements of trading within a Minangkabau context. These reflect part
of social Minangkabau life. One trader, Mawar (60) expressed it in an adat proverb:
Muluik manih, kucindan murah
Lamak diawak, katuju diurang
(The nice words, the joy of talks
What we like is what is acceptable to the other)
In general, this proverb means that the social balance is an integral part of
successful transaction. The feeling of the Minangkabauness (urang Minang) cannot be put
aside only in a single sphere of daily life. Doing business, or not, the Minangkabau must
put this feeling first in order to maintain relationships.
In many cases, however, the social relationships, maintained by traders at the
market places, do not automatically lead to the establishment of a business network. Thus,
networks among traders at the marketplace can be characterized by specific process. This
can be formulated as follows:
1. The network will be established if an internal competition is not present. In other
words, the absence of network reflects the presence of internal competition. Traders do
not want to participate in a network with traders who sell similar types of goods,
because of competition. Traders do not want to establish a certain network as long as
they are involved in trading competition with each other.
2. In many cases, a network is predominantly established in relation to the goal of profit.
But, when this goal is not met, the solution is not blamed the mechanism of the network
itself, rather an answer is sought in the religious sphere. The final decision on the
trading network is based on faith in God (pasrah).
3. Hence, the network among Minangkabau traders does not only represent a mode of
social or economic action, but also of a religious belief. This is because the formal
system of the economy, that protect actors from negative impacts of the network is not
available. In this sense, the formal regulation of the economy or of customary law are
absent in the operation of business networks. Therefore, the network is quite shaky in
practice. The network cannot depend on it as a mean of success in all trade activities.
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